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RESTRICTED 
THE HERITAGE OF TYRE 
A lecture delivered by 
Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, U. S. N. 
at the Naval War College 
December 17, 1948 
Since man first sat astride a floating log and propelled 
himself with a piece of driftwood, the waterways have served 
not only as frontiers but as areas of conflict and avenues of in­
tercourse between peoples. It is, for instance, the ocean routes and 
not the impassable land barriers between them which truly .join 
North and South America. The same was true in the old world. 
The Mediterranean, though separating three continents, was the 
chief means of contact, conflict and the spread of the civilization 
which grew up along its shores. Here trade, piracy, and organ­
ized sea warfare seemed to have flourished from pre-historic times. 
The first great seafaring people were apparently the 
Cretans or Minoans, but Phoenicia with her great port of Tyre was 
the first maritime nation of which we know the history. Phoeni­
cian ships more than 12 centuries before Christ were receiving 
the wealth of the East, and distributing it along the shores of the 
Mediterranean. It is hard to overstress the importance of these 
early mariners as builders of civilization. The venturesome ex­
plorer who brought his ship into some uncharted port not only 
opened up a new source of wealth for himself but also quickened 
civilization at both ends of his route. The cargo ships that left 
the Nile Delta distributed the arts of Egypt as well as her wheat. 
Greece, was the next nation after Phoenicia to become a 
sea power, and her great victory over Xerxes navy at Salamis was 
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what really ended the menace of Persia on European soil. Upon 
its issue depended the Golden Age of Athens which reached its 
flower in the 80 years following, and which could hardly have come 
had Greece fallen under the demoralizing influence of oriental 
rule. Salamis was therefore a victory not only for Greece but for 
all of mankind. 
Two centuries elapsed between the Greek victory at Salamis 
and the Punic Wars, a second great struggle between alien races 
for Mediterranean control. Here again it can be said that the wel: 
fare of mankind rode with victory in that struggle. Compared 
with the culture of Rome, with its law, engineering and ideals of 
practical efficiency, the civilization of Carthage was barren and 
sterile. 
Carthage, herself a Phoenician colony, had centuries of ex­
perience in seafaring and sea fighting while Rome was predomi­
nantly a land power. But Rome was young, lean and hard while 
Carthage was old, and ripe for plucking. So Rome took to the sea 
and, after a long struggle, destroyed Carthaginian sea power. 
Thus was Rome forced reluctantly upon the sea. Rome 
then, in turn, became dominant on every Mediterranean shore and, 
through sea power she gained the world. For the next six cen­
turies the Mediterranean was to remain for the Romans mare
nostrum ( our sea) • 
In the year 328 A. D., the Emperor Constantine the Great 
shifted his capitol from Rome to Byzantium now known as Is­
tanbul but best known to us as Constantinople. It is a strange 
commentary upon the indifference of us of the western world that 
we could owe an incalculable debt to the eastern Roman Empire and 
yet rem,ain so ignorant on the subject. While Rome fell apart and
Europe broke up in chaos and descended into the Dark Ages, a single 
citadel of western culture stood fast at Constantinople, a preserver 
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of Christianity and the cultural heritage of Greece and Rome, as 
well as a civilizing influence upon slavic people to the northward. 
For a period of over 700 years, a time longer than from her final 
fall in 1453 until today, Byzantium alone stayed the westward 
sweep of Mohammedanism under first the Saracen and then the 
Turk until the weak states of Europe could grow strong enough 
to finally halt the sons of the prophet at the gates of Vienna. 
Again, it is a story of the East against the West, of the struggle 
of alien peoples for the Mediterranean. And it is a story of sea 
power. 
During her 1000 years of life, Byzantium stood firm only as 
long as she kept hold on the sea. Each time she failed to do this 
her strength dwindled until at last she had shrunk to a mere city 
fortress the doom of which was assured long before it fell. The 
Turks finally took Constantinople after a brief siege of seven 
weeks. 
The resulting Turkish supremacy in the Mediterranean was 
the direct cause of the great voyages of discovery. Blocked by 
the Turks fro.m the old caravan trade routes to China, the West 
turned toward the open sea to seek Cathay west across the At­
lantic· and south around Africa. 
The rise of Portugal was a spectacular phenomenon of the 
Age of Discovery. Her intrepid navigators rounded Africa to 
open a sea. route to the Indies and made Portugal the richest na-
,, tion in Europe, with a great colonial empire and claims to dominion 
over half the seas of the world. But the Portuguese system of 
colonial administration or rather exploitation, was even worse than 
Spain's and. Portugal fell back into the ranks of lesser states. 
The rise and fall of Spain is a tragic parallel of Portugal's. 
As Portugal first turned south and east, Spain was to go westward 
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to Mexico and Peru to carry her pillage and her conquest. From 
the ancient Aztec and Inca empires Spain was to wring the gold 
and silver with which to finance the next centuries of wars, wars 
whose outcomes were to give racial, religious, and political form 
to the world in which we live. But Spain, too, was to fail due to 
many causes which may be roughly summed up as a lack of mari­
time genius. 
Next it was Holland whose turn it was to flash dramatically 
across the pages of history. Her rise to wealth and power was a 
tribute to Dutch character, integrity, hard-headed business sense 
and native maritime genius, for it was the sea alone which gave 
Holland an avenue to greatness. Her fall came after she had spent 
herself against the maritime strength of England. 
France too was to make her bid for sea -power and French 
naval history is a story of promise· alternating with· disappoint­
ment. The French navy has known periods of great glory and, in its 
lowest estate, never dishonored the military reputation so dear to • 
that nation. Yet as a maritime nation, France has never held more 
than a respectable position. 
Some peculiar quirk of national character seemed to color the 
naval strategy of France. Her officers sought to economize their 
fleet, to use it in commerce warfare rather than in battle. Even 
when fortune favored France, she lost golden opportunities due 
to this fatal weakness which corrupted her officers. The English 
officer, on the contrary, sought out the enemy and took the of­
f e:nsive, retrieving many a blunder in strategy and tactics by sheer 
hard hitting. 
This brings us to England where we will pick up the threads 
of our story and tie them together, for the true story of modern 
sea power until aft�r the turn of this the 20th century has been 
the history of England. While others rose to shine but briefly 
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though often brilliantly, she was to climb steadily until she be­
came the acknowledged mistress of the seas. This control of the 
sea exercised by England was not the gift of fortune. It was a 
prize gained, in the main, by wise policy in peace and hard fight­
ing in war. 
England first defeated the Spanish Navy, and then it was 
Holland who must meet the challenge of the British Isles. There 
followed three great wars in which the Dutch fought with epic 
gallantry. But in the Third Dutch War France teamed up with 
England, and Holland was reduced to the last extremity. Faced on 
the land by France, the dominating military power, and on the sea 
by the combined might of the British and French navies, all 
seemed lost. And yet Holland was not defeated. She opened 
her dikes to check the armies of invasion and, under her great 
Admiral deRyder, fought the navies of France and England to a 
standstill. When peace eventually came all honors were hers but 
she was an exhausted and prostrate land, and Holland, like Spain, 
settled back in slow decline. 
This enmity of the French king for the Dutch which led him 
to team up with the English had gained nothing for France and 
everything for England. Unwittingly Louis XIV had built up the 
only country that could become the greatest colonial and maritime 
rival of France. A series of wars were now to blaze forth be­
tween England and France with such frequency that the two na­
tions were to remain at daggers' points for the next century and 
a quarter. 
Time permits only the barest mention of a few of these 
wars, important though they be. In the Seven Years' War, the 
British Fleet was to prove a priceless weapon. Teamed up with 
Wolfe, that 18th century master of amphibious warfare, it was 
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to wreck the French colonial Elmpire. The Seven Years' War 
finally ended in terms of deepest humiliation to France. She was 
compelled to renounce to England all of Canada ,the Ohio Valley and 
the entire area east of the Mississippi, except the then sickly 
little settlement at New Orleans. 
No peace such as., that following the Seven Years' Wars 
could be permanent. Every patriotic Frenchman burned with a 
passion for revenge. The · opportunity came with the American 
Revolution. From the outset France was unneutral and, after the 
capture of Burgoyne, she decided to enter the war openly. It may 
seem startingly to say, but the Revolutionary War was as much 
naval as it was military. Before the entry of France, the English 
kept their army supplied by sea and forced Washington into the 
cruel depths of Valley Forge. George Washington, himself, ac­
knowledged it was the French Navy that really saved America. 
And the final victory, which was assured when Cornwallis sur­
rendered at Yorktown, came from a temporary loss of control of 
Cornwallis' sea communications. 
Ten years after the American Revolution British sea power 
was drawn into a more prolonged and desperate conflict with 
France following· the French Revolution. As the war dragged on, 
Spain and Holland were to add their navies to that of France and 
the rise of Bonaparte was to make France supreme on the Con­
tinent. But the magnitude of these events on land during · which 
Napoleon fought a hundred bloody campaigns, overthrew king., 
doms, and remade the map of Europe, obscures the prime im­
portance of the warfare that went on the sea. For it was Great 
Britain by virtue of her navy and insular position that remained 
Napoleon's least vulnerable and most obstinate opponent, forc­
ing him to ever renewed and exhausting campaigns, reviving con­
tinental opposition and supporting it with subsidies made possi­
ble by control of sea trade. 
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Finally, at Trafalgar, the English won a signal victory 
against a much larger French fleet in what is universally ac­
counted one of the decisive battles of the world. Napoleon who 
had been planning an invasion of England faced his army back 
towards the Continent saying: "It will be Britain that forces us 
to conquer Europe." The great conqueror had set his feet .on 
the path leading to Moscow and Waterloo. 
It was in that same June of 1812 when Napoleon gath­
ered his "army of twenty nations" for the Russian Campaign 
that the United States declared war on Great Britain. The tiny 
American Navy fought brilliantly but was inevitably smothered 
by weight of numbers and the final peace settled none of the dif­
ferences that had begun the war. 
The remainder of the 19th century was to be a period of 
relative peace thanks to the British naval predominance which 
had broken the Napoleonic hegemony, stripped France of practi­
cally all of her American possessions· and made . America north of 
the Rio Grande English in speech, laws and traditions. The Union 
blockade crippled the finances of the South, shut out munitions and 
food stuffs, and was a major factor in the downfall of the Con­
federacy. The Japanese defeat of the Chinese Navy in the Bat­
tle of the Yalu in 1894, marked the emergence of Japan as a formid:­
able force in international affairs and brought in a period of in­
tensified colonial and commercial rivalry in the Far East. And 
finally in 1898, the last sorry act was played out in dying Spanish 
sea power. Spain was ignominously defeated in both the Battles 
of Manila Bay and Santiago. 
In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War broke out in best Japan­
ese tradition by a vicious attack without declaration of war. This 
war was marked by two great Japanese naval victories; the first 
off Port Arthur on August 10, 1904 and the second in Tsushima 
Straits on the 27th of May, 1905. 
39 
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The Russo-Japanese War greatly weakened Russia's posi­
tion in Europe, leaving the dual alliance of France and Russia out­
weighed by that of Germany and Austria. This upsetting of the 
European balance of power coupled with Germany's commercial 
rivalry and the growing might of the German navy forced Eng­
land to abandon her neutral position in between and the First 
World War was to find her on the side of France and Russia. 
World War I was fundamentally akin to the Napoleonic 
Wars, a struggle between land power predominant on the Contin­
ent and naval power supreme on the seas. The English blockade 
was soon to make its strangling power felt. As had the French 
before them, the Germans retaliated with commerce raiding. But 
unlike France, Germany had the submarine, which was soon to 
prove one of the greatest perils of the sea. Its effective­
ness was to be deeply underscored by the almost complete Eng­
lish dependency upon the sea. The battle against the submarine 
was finally won but the margin was dangerously close. 
We need not concern ourselves too closely with the various 
naval actions of the First World War. The English fleet was to 
keep the sea while the German fleet found it impossible to break 
out through the steel ring of Britain. However, we should briefly 
review the one great naval battle of the war which was fought at 
Jutland. Here England won at least a strategic victory but failed to 
destroy the German fleet. Had England won an epic victory, Jut­
land would have marked the turning point of the war instead of 
leading, in Churchill's own words, "Directly to the submarine peril 
of 1917." The German submarine campaign could never have at­
tained the effectiveness it did. But most important of all, Russia 
could have been kept in the war. For, paradoxically, the first 
victim" of sea power in World War I was not Germany, but Eng-
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land's ally Russia who succumbed to the German Navy. Ninety 
percent of Russia's imports were cut off by the combined efforts 
of the German navy, which blockaded the Baltic, and Germany's 
Turkish ally who held the Dardanelles. Russia suffered terrible 
losses from the resulting lack of munitions, and this desperate plight 
of Russia was the most compelling reason for the British Dardan­
elles' Campaign. Unfortunately, however;· the Campaign was a 
tragic failure, and Russia fell' into ruins. , 
So much for the First World War. The. Second World War, 
with some justification, has been called a continuation of that First 
World War which had .been interrupted by .a period of armed truc,e. 
Certainly the twenty-five years which began in 1914, have the 
qualities of a great .tragedy. The League of Nations proved to 
be an unhappy failure and the world was to watch .the clouds of 
war grow ever more ominous. France by her unwillingness to 
make timely concessions to a moderate German government hasten­
ed that government's fall which brough.
t 
.into power the ele­
ments of extreme dissatisfaction. EnglB.Ild, disturbed. by French, 
predominance, which overthrew . the balance of, power, was not 
. • . .  , ,, 
altogether unsympathetic towards a resurgent Germany. Am�ri-
ca resolutely .turned .her back on the wprld, d�termined to regain 
her historic isolation. Germany, far from penitent, wished only 
to correct mistakes which had somehow robbed her superior war 
machine of the fruits of victory and. hoped yet to wrench rich 
spoils from decadent :neighbors. Japan: the most recent and most 
irresponsible recruit to Imperialism, was determined to follow her 
destiny towards a dream of world domination; while Italy, steeped 
in nostalgic dreams of an ancient glory, skulked like a greedy 
jackal in the trail of the jungle giants. 
By 1933 it was evident that the three nations, Japan, Italy 
and Germany, were set upon paths leading inevitably and fatally 
to war. Thereafter, events were to transpire with increasing fre-
41 
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quericy which were to carry the whole world into another mortal 
conflict. It was now too plain that the forces of aggression could 
only be stopped by force, but out of an anarchy of compromise, a 
policy of appeasement had been born and Germany's opponents 
were to absorb even ruder shocks before their deep-rooted anti-war 
sentiments could be overcome. Finally in 1938, the world saw 
the supreme humiliation of England at Munich, and when on 
September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, England and 
France, pushed beyond all limits, declared war two days later. The 
Second World War had begun. Or had it begun in 1937 with the 
Japanese invasion of China; or earlier still, in 1931, when Japan 
invaded Manchuria? Indeed, had the troubled peace-begun by the 
Armistice and unsolved by the vengeful treaty of Versailles­
been other than an armed truce while nations realined and re­
armed to continue the struggle to see which one could claw its 
way to the top? 
In the beginning German victories on the Continent came 
with such clock-like regularity that, in less than a year, Poland, 
Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France had been over­
run. On the 22nd of June, 1940, France signed an humiliating 
armistice which was to reduce her to virtual slavery throughout 
the remainder of the war. 
But across the Channel the British people seemed to sud­
denly discover a new reservoir of power and confidence. The 
Chamberlain government fell and behind the courageous and dy­
namic leadership of Winston Churchill, the English rallied to show 
a deathless courage,· a stamina and fortitude worthy · of English­
men of any other age. An outnumbered Royal Air Force fought 
back the horde of German aircraft which, with increasing in­
tensity throughout the summer, sought to drive it from the skies 
as a prelude to invasion. 
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Finally, defeated in the air over Britain, Germany was to 
again turn to the Continent and the Balkan states were overrun 
or forced into vassalage. Then on June the 22nd, 1941, Hitler, 
like Napoleon before him, was to begin his fateful Russian ad­
venture. For a while the German army swept all before it and, 
in October and November, victory seemed imminent. Japan de­
cided that time was ripe fot her complete entrance into a struggle 
bidding fair to recarve the world into totalitarian empires and on 
December 7, 1941, began war without warning by an air raid 
against the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. 
What of sea power during this titanic struggle of land and 
air warfare, which, in a little over two years, had swept across 
the face of the earth? 
This time a wiser Germany was able to soften the effects of 
blockade by stockpiling, the development of synthetics, and through 
conquest, the acquirement . of the stockpiles of neighboring states 
and the incorporation into her economy of vast areas with their 
sources of raw materials. Thus the negative effect of sea power's 
denial of commerce was, temporarily at least, defeated; but Eng­
land and her Allies were to continue to enjoy the positive boon 
of huge imports throughout the duration of the war. 
Germany, recognizing England's complete dependence on 
the sea, was to bend every effort to accomplish what she had failed 
to do before-sever the British lifeline. - The struggle was to be a 
seesaw with the submarine finally going down in defeat, but again 
the margin was dangerously close. 
Later as America found her strength the sea was to supply a 
crushing bomber off erisive and make possible a series of amphibious 
operations which finally liberated• Europe and--·destroyed the Ger­
man army. It was sea power which won at El Alamein and in the 
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later North African invasion. It was the same story in Sicily and 
in Italy when the foes of Germany were to return to the Continent 
at last. And, again, it was the long arm of sea power that, in the 
early dawn of June the 6th, 1944, supported the invasion of France 
which was to set the final seal of bankruptcy on German strategy. 
But it was in the Pacific that sea power more than ever was 
to prove the handmaiden of victory. Fought across the largest 
body of water in the world, an ocean only sparsely dotted with small 
islands, the war in the Pacific was obviously from the start a naval 
war., For no other reason, Japan's first and choice objective was 
the American fleet. 
You know the rest of the story as well as I. Japan received 
her first check in the Coral Sea when a seaborne invasion aimed at 
the capture of Port Moresby was forced to turn back. Then came 
Midway. Many informed Japanese saw in Midway the turning 
point of the war, and so calamitous were the results considered, 
that the story was never announced in the homeland until after 
final surrender. 
Many famous battles were fought and many epic and gallant 
deeds were done which have added rich pages to our history. I wish 
I had the time to discuss them. But I must rest content by say­
ing that the United States succeeded in welding land, sea and air 
forces into an amphibious machine which moved amphibiously 
across the most forbidding distances in the world and succeeded 
in severing Japan from her sources of supply and provided the 
bases and the logistic support required by the Air Force in its 
great bomber offensive against Japan. 
And so to sum up this little thumb nail sketch which covers 
all of written history, we find that the prime importance of sea 
power is clearly demonstrable from the days of Tyre until today. 
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Sea power denies the enemy the sinews of war and provides them 
for one's- self. Sea power permits us to carry war to the enemy 
thus forcing him to fight at home where it hurts. This will also 
ease our own defense requirements, for the enemy will 
have to expend precious resources in defense that he might other­
wise use in attacking us. Worse than that (from his point of view), 
he will grow to live in constant dread of our landings and will have 
to spread his forces so thin in order to protect himself in all di­
rections that no matter how big his army and air force, he will 
find they are never big enough. For the choice of the point of at­
tack is always given to that nation which controls the sea. 
"But why seize and build these bases?" I am asked. "Cannot 
our airplanes fly there, bomb the enemy, and then get back?" 
No, they cannot; that is, none we have built yet can do it. Nor 
do our scientists hold out any promise of airplanes that can do so 
at any time soon. Of course we can refuel them in the air, but that 
is an expensive way to do it. Besides fighters cannotgo along to 
protect the bombers, and bombers must have their fighter cover. 
But, even if we had super long-range bombers and fighters, 
there is another compelling reason why we must have our bomber 
bases close to the enemy. If we cut the distance a bomber must fly 
in half, we multiply its effectiveness by four. If we cut the dis­
tance down to one-fourth, we will multiply its effectiveness by 
sixteen. 
This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons, includ­
ing the guided missile. The day of the long range guided missile 
is still many years -in the future but when it comes, navies will 
still be needed to take it closer to the enemy so that we can enjoy 
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But what about the atomic bomb? Hasn't this changed the 
whole complexion of war? 
Of course it has. I would be the last to deprecate the terrible 
potentialities of this weapon which can only be described in words 
of horror. But nothing has changed our fundamental laws. The 
way to win a war is still the same and will continue to be the same. 
To be victorious war must be carried to the enemy. Atomic bombs 
are tremendously expensive. The number will always be too limited 
to waste any trying to hit a target thousands of miles away when 
we have the means of getting much closer. Germany alone ab­
sorbed the equivalent of 200 atomic bombs in the last war. Indeed 
Mr. P. M., S. Plunkett, Nobel prize winner and famous physicist, 
puts the number in the thousands, but choosing the lesser number, 
we do not now have that many nor does it appear that we have 
any expectation of ever having that many in the future. But, even 
if we do, we must not waste them in a long range effort. 
And so, in conclusion, we find that theface of the globe has 
not changed, though many have chosen to ignore the continued 
existence of the oceans and seas. Even the pictures in our mag­
azines which so vividly portray the world as round are actually 
misleading. They usually show the part of the world that is land. 
They make us forget that three-fourths of the earth's surface is 
covered by water, and only one-quarter by land. 
New weapons and the increased efficiency of land, sea and 
air transportation, have all served to complicate modern living, but 
they have not changed the basic facts of life, either in peace or 
war. The coming of age of air power as a decisive w:'eapon of 
war, is of enormous and far reaching conseque_nces. I, as one who 
has spent a quarter of a century in aviation, would be the last to 
deprecate this fact. But the case for sea power was never so 
strong as it is today. We can lose another war if we ever permit 
ourselves to forget it. 
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